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Abstract
Sino-American economic joint ventures are most often studied through a lens of technical rationality 
that typically emphasizes organizational efficiency, reduces culture to a manageable resource, and 
views conflict as discrete disruptions requiring efficient handling. Here, we conceptualize Sino-Amer-
ican business partnerships as sites of struggle where co-managers’ accounts of intercultural disagree-
ments reveal friction around action, voice, interests, and identity. We propose cooperative struggle 
as a critical management practice for working creatively with the multiple forms of difference that 
arise in this organizational form. 
Keywords: Sino-American Joint Ventures, Intercultural Conflict, Power and Resistance, Coopera-
tive Struggle   
International corporate partnerships have a long history of creating and attempting to 
impose large-scale economic forces from the global North on the South (Ritzer, 2010). 
Research into this phenomenon often operates within a lens of technical/ instrumen-
tal rationality, emphasizing organizational effectiveness and the ways in which cul-
tural differences, though recognized, might be used for corporate purposes, rather 
than how local groups might push back against these pressures (Stohl & Ganesh, 2013). 
Theoretical developments in ‘‘cultural intelligence’’ and its systematic deployment as 
a transnational management strategy are but one recent illustration of the tendency to 
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instrumentalize culture and discipline managerial use of cultural knowledge in mul-
tinational corporations (Earley & Ang, 2003). Reducing culture to a business or man-
agement resource favors globalization-from-above and hides the ways in which these 
approaches privilege Western logics (Dutta & Dutta, 2013). 
Rather than viewing international partnerships and their respective cultures as po-
litically neutral backgrounds for the negotiation of business interests, we approach 
them as dynamic systems where a full range of social, cultural, and political differ-
ences are expressed and contested (Kwok-bun & Douw, 2006; Martin, 1997). We adopt 
a critical lens to conceptualize international corporate partnerships as sites of strug-
gle where the need to work cooperatively toward corporate goals co-exists with the 
need to maintain important differences arising not just from within the corporation 
but between the corporation and the larger society (Alvesson & Deetz, 2000). We fo-
cus on corporate joint ventures between China and the United States to better under-
stand how those who manage them characterize and negotiate cultural disagreements 
as they struggle to meet the challenges of working cooperatively toward organiza-
tional goals without necessarily becoming the same. In highlighting managerial strug-
gles around the meanings and expressions of cultural differences we hope to continue 
challenging the West’s problematic relationship with diversity (see, for example, Al-
len, 2004; Dutta & Dutta, 2013; Munshi, 2005) and contribute to more polysemic and 
socially responsible understandings of difference and intercultural communication 
(Bardhan & Orbe, 2012). 
Sino-American partnerships present a rich case for our project because they oper-
ate within a complex and dynamic context of difference. One of the world’s oldest con-
tinuing civilizations, with a history spanning close to 4,000 years (Spence, 1990), China 
is keenly aware that the cultivation of ‘‘a sense of the Chinese people as a unit … must 
be mobilized for its own survival’’ (Spence, 1990, p. 231). Appeals to such nationalist 
feelings arise as the country’s leaders hold firm to traditional values while also guid-
ing considerable economic change (Spence, 1990). China’s rapid economic develop-
ment and participation in the global economy does not neatly fit the Western pattern 
of economic development and modernization (Boisot & Child, 1996; Kang, 1998; Shen-
kar, 2005; Tyers, 2012; Walder, 1995), and its transformation into a capitalist world econ-
omy has occurred without significant political change (Kang, 1998; Lippit et al., 2011). 
This presents ‘‘a formidable challenge to the homogeneity of Western capitalist moder-
nity’’ (Ban, Sastry & Dutta, 2013, p. 15). Forecast to pass the United States as the world’s 
largest economy before 2030 (Lippit et al, 2011), the Chinese economy has continued 
to expand, largely on its own terms, despite political crises (e.g., pro-democracy activ-
ism and the Tiananmen Square tragedy), environmental crises (e.g., air and water pol-
lution) and potentially catastrophic public health crises (e.g., avian flu). In light of Chi-
na’s growing economic power and its ability to succeed, in part, by ignoring the advice 
of prominent advisors from the West, China’s state-run economy and approach to cap-
italism is likely to remain different from the model of free-market capitalism guiding 
the United States and many other Western economies (Dodson, 2012; Shenkar, 2005). 
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Thus, while business partnerships between China and the United States require coop-
eration, they also straddle deep ideological differences, and are increasingly shaped by 
China’s considerable capacity to resist and challenge a de-valuing of those differences 
(e.g., Shome, 2006). The next section further explores the tensions underpinning Sino-
American international business partnerships. 
Sino-American Joint Ventures as Sites of Struggle 
A series of economic reforms initiated by the Chinese government in 1979 intensified the 
formation of international joint ventures with foreign firms, structuring them in ways 
that allow Chinese investors access to foreign capital, advanced technology, and tech-
nical managerial expertise while maintaining some degree of control over how these 
various investments will be used (Child, 1994). By the mid-1990s, the government had 
approved at least 37,000 international joint ventures involving approximately $26.7 bil-
lion worth of foreign investment (Chen, 1995) and by the late-1990s had approved an-
other 21,000 ventures involving an additional $61.5 billion. Formed as legal partner-
ships between two parent companies, both sides enter into these agreements expecting 
to share control, to participate in strategic decision-making, and to share some busi-
ness advantage (Yan, 2000). In reality, the balance sometimes diverges with the Chi-
nese partner bearing the greater onus and responsibility for maintaining relationships 
with local businesses and the government to help monitor the need for policy change 
within the company (Chen, 2000; Krone, Chen, Sloan & Gallant, 1997), and the West-
ern partner providing business and financial expertise, frequently within a formal con-
tract that legally favors their side (Wels, 1996). 
Sino-American joint ventures are hybrid organizational forms, complicated by mul-
tiple differences, with success dependent upon understanding and working well with 
these differences (Ashcraft, 2001; Hatch & Cunliffe, 2006). While all organizations can be 
conceptualized as tension-filled and producing struggle around which meanings gain 
traction or advantage over time (Trethewey & Ashcraft, 2004), Sino-American joint ven-
tures manifest particularly complex forms of difference which come into play as man-
agers work to promote the corporation’s interests while protecting each side’s interests. 
In their earliest years, these ventures tended to impose Western cultural and economic 
values on the Chinese partner, creating concerns around the foreign exploitation of work-
ers and the potentially corrupting influence of the West on Chinese society (Hutton & 
Giddens, 2000; Luttwak, 1999). More recent Sino- American joint ventures, however, op-
erate according to equally large-scale, but different economic and political forces. More 
than ever before, the experience of co-managing these corporate partnerships involves 
navigating a range of cultural, political, and economic differences. For example, West-
ern managers may take for granted the principles of free-market capitalism and assume 
that their Chinese counterparts are willing students of these principles. However, a 2013 
Chinese Communist Party publication presented the most recent global financial crisis 
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as evidence of the failure of ‘‘Western Market Fundamentalism’’ and as an opening for 
the ascendance of Marxist economic principles (Yu Zurao, 2012). The routine managerial 
work of representing interests and taking action in Sino-American joint ventures is com-
plicated by the potential of such differences to disrupt assumptions and animate inter-
pretive struggles around how businesses should operate in a global economy. 
As hybrid organizational forms, Sino-American business ventures have the poten-
tial to enhance understanding of each partner’s country’s politics and approach to busi-
ness and culture, but doing so depends upon the ability to articulate multiple differ-
ences and to understand the tensions among them. Unlike many domestic organizations 
where differing interests are often left unstated or suppressed (Deetz, 1992), tensions 
routinely arise and are often made explicit in the management of Sino-American joint 
ventures. Our project attempts to better understand these processes by locating commu-
nication about differences within a larger context of struggle over how managers from 
both sides work out ways to cooperate while also maintaining important distinctions. 
Business researchers have often framed questions of working with differences in 
the context of international corporate partnerships as studies of intercultural conflict 
or processes of managing interpersonal communication between managers from dif-
ferent countries and national cultures (see Wang, Kwok-bun & Luk, 2006 for a review). 
Such studies typically assume a Western business management perspective and a nor-
mative lens that simplifies intercultural conflict in order to subdue and handle it more 
effectively. The ability to work well with intercultural conflict is reduced to awareness 
of general group-based differences in interpersonal conflict styles between Western-
ers and the Chinese, without attending to differences within groups or the larger po-
litical or economic context. These studies, then, risk oversimplifying intercultural con-
flict, inadvertently reinforcing cultural stereotypes (see, for example, Kirkbride, Tang, 
& Westwood, 1991; Wang, Lin, Chan, & Shi, 2005; Xie, Song, & Stringfellow, 1998). Us-
ing these models to train expatriate managers can perpetuate the West’s self-serving 
representations of the East, rather than facilitating critical awareness of such represen-
tations and strengthening the capacity to challenge them (Viswanathan, 2001). For ex-
ample, while Chinese respondents may report using an avoiding conflict style more fre-
quently than Westerners, for at least some Chinese managers, avoiding is understood 
as ‘‘a proactive retreat for the purpose of advancing,’’ or as ‘‘pursuing by making a 
detour,’’ rather than deliberately avoiding dealing with the conflict altogether (Ding, 
1996, p. 48). Here, we hope to contribute to more polysemic understandings of inter-
cultural conflict by highlighting the ways managers of Sino-American joint ventures 
articulate disagreements with their counterparts without referencing Westernized pre-
understandings of conflict styles (Broadfoot & Munshi, 2007). 
Communication scholars have produced increasingly nuanced theoretical accounts 
of intercultural communication including third-culture building (Casmir, 1993), inter-
cultural sensitivity (Bennett, 1993), and how cultural values operate unevenly in organi-
zational communication (Lindsley & Braithwaite, 2008). At the same time, these models 
tend to foreground relational approaches to cultural differences while overlooking the 
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potentially complex relational dynamics arising from the co-presence of political and 
economic differences. Thus, we locate Sino-American joint ventures and intercultural 
conflict within this larger context, and view culture itself as a site of struggle (Martin 
& Nakayama, 1999; Shome & Hegde, 2002) where the majority of intercultural interac-
tions are highly asymmetrical (Cooks, 2001). We downplay these organizations as ideal 
sites where Chinese and American managers can synthesize cultural differences into 
a transcendent unity, especially when managers are expected to represent and protect 
their distinctive interests. Instead, we recognize them as sites of struggle (Deetz, 1992; 
Mumby & Clair, 1997) where conflict plays out even among high-level managers. For 
example, management of multinational corporations such as Sino-American joint ven-
tures has been characterized as both masculinizing and feminizing, at least for U.S. 
managers, who are called to succeed in a hypercompetitive global environment, but to 
do so while remaining socially sensitive and working on someone else’s ground (Ca-
las & Smircich, 1993). Such tensions can be managed in ways that create more or less 
space for questioning technical/ instrumental understandings of organizational effec-
tiveness and for finding creative alternatives. Thus, we recognize the organizational, 
political, and economic forces that make culture a site of contested meanings (Martin 
& Nakayama, 1999) and the struggles that ensue over which meanings will take hold 
and prevail at particular points in time. In the next section, we sketch out the contours 
of these dynamics as cooperative struggle. 
Cooperative Struggle as an Alternative Lens 
As discussed, studies of intercultural conflict in Sino-American joint ventures that adopt 
a lens of technical/instrumental rationality tend to reduce culture to categorical dif-
ferences, and conflict to interpersonal style choices and discrete episodes that can be 
handled and managed. We propose the concept of cooperative struggle as an alterna-
tive lens through which to explore the subject of intercultural conflict among partners 
of Sino-American joint ventures. Working from Fleming and Spicer (2007), struggle is 
constitutive of self-consciousness, identity, and social arrangements rather than simply 
expressive of pre-existing states. Rather than blocking communication, struggle occurs 
mainly through communicative action, which includes social categorization processes 
and the production of social relations not just between, but also within groups. In con-
trast to more conventional understandings of conflict management where discrete epi-
sodes of conflict arise and are handled, struggle is best understood as an on-going com-
municative process of negotiating identities and social arrangements (Fleming & Spicer, 
2007). We adopt the interpretive lens of struggle here to move beyond technical/ratio-
nal understandings of intercultural conflict and to better understand how such strug-
gles identify and deal with differences, including those that cannot be negotiated or 
resolved. While managers of Sino-American joint ventures need to operate within in-
stitutional constraints related to the corporation’s economic performance, the partners 
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also are able to access and draw upon their respective material and symbolic resources 
to both influence and resist each other over time (Alvesson & Deetz, 2000). Hence strug-
gle is an ongoing form of social engagement in which both power and resistance are 
actively in play (Fleming & Spicer, 2007). Re-interpreting Chinese and American man-
gers’ accounts of intercultural conflict as expressions of struggle around differences in 
interests, action, voice, and identity (Fleming & Spicer, 2007), we explore the concept 
of cooperative struggle as an alternative way of understanding intercultural conflict in 
the co-management of Sino-American joint ventures. 
Method 
Our interest in challenging and reframing more conventional representations of inter-
cultural conflict required a critical research approach. Critical research is designed in 
such a way to produce insight, critique, and transformative redefinition (Alvesson & 
Deetz, 2000). Here, the production of insight involves turning something self-evident or 
taken-for-granted into something more complex and open; the production of critique 
involves highlighting the privileging of certain meanings or discourses over others; and 
the production of transformative redefinition involves producing new concepts or prac-
tices that enhance social life for multiple stakeholders (Alvesson & Deetz, 2000). Our re-
search material consisted primarily of conflict accounts gained via research interviews 
conducted with managers of Sino-American corporate partnerships located in Beijing. 
Under the first author’s supervision, a native Chinese man—a former doctoral student 
at the University of Nebraska- Lincoln, and employed at the time by the Office of Inter-
national Relations at Peking University—used personal and professional connections 
to locate organizations and managers to participate in this research. Because he was flu-
ent in Chinese (Mandarin) and in English he was able to conduct all research interviews 
in each participant’s preferred language. His direct involvement in the data collection 
process was crucial to minimizing Western-style representations and other orientalist 
tendencies in the research process (Said, 1978). In particular, his life experience and ex-
pertise helped ease the expression of intercultural conflict experiences among Chinese 
managers and increased the likelihood that they would characterize their experience on 
their own terms rather than through Western-style pre-understandings of the Chinese. 
Ten Chinese, one British, and six American managers working in six joint ventures 
and two wholly owned U.S. subsidiaries agreed to participate in the research. Among 
the joint ventures, two had ownership evenly distributed between the sides, while the 
remaining four favored one party over the other. All of the joint venture partnerships 
were formed between previously existing Chinese organizations (i.e., state-owned en-
terprises) and well-established corporations from the United States. The joint ventures 
produced large boiler systems, various types of industrial gases, advanced medical sys-
tems for hospitals, automotive systems for cars and light trucks, a range of industrial 
chemicals, and detergents. The two wholly owned companies are widely known in the 
United States for their production of electronics and computer systems.  
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In order to encourage rich accounts of intercultural conflict experience and to min-
imize the influence of our own pre-understandings, we deployed a semistructured in-
terview process (Alvesson & Deetz, 2000). Interviews began with each manager being 
asked for descriptions of a disagreement they had had while working with their co-
manager. If several disagreements came to mind, we asked them to select the one that 
was of greatest importance. We then asked what they said or did during the disagree-
ment and why they chose to handle the situation the way they did. Next we asked 
what their co-manager said in response to them, followed by whether there was any-
thing they would have liked to have said during the disagreement, but didn’t. Finally, 
we asked for metaphorical depictions of what the experience of disagreeing with their 
counterpart was like and for any advice they would give others on how to handle these 
kinds of disagreements. 
Of the 17 managers interviewed, all but four were male. The sample of Western 
managers was ethnically diverse including one Vietnamese American and two Chi-
nese Americans (originally from Hong Kong). Three of the American respondents had 
previously managed companies in Europe, South America, Africa, Japan, Malaysia, 
India, or Thailand. The British manager had likewise previously managed several in-
ternational companies. The inclusion of multiple Western partners with hyphenated 
ethnic identities helped enable a more polysemic interpretation of the research ma-
terials. Several of the Chinese managers had previously managed state-owned en-
terprises, and while none of the Chinese managers had international management 
experience, one reported having visited the joint venture corporate headquarters 
in the United States. In order to protect their privacy, managers were given pseud-
onyms. Because of the varied national, ethnic, and cultural backgrounds of our par-
ticipants, we chose these from the public registries of common names in the United 
States and China. 
The interviews lasted from 40 minutes to two hours, and were audio-recorded and 
mailed to the United States for transcription. The English interview tapes were reviewed 
by the lead author and then professionally transcribed, resulting in 57 pages of typed, 
single-spaced pages of text. The Chinese interview tapes were sent to colleagues at 
Hong Kong Baptist University where a graduate student in communication translated 
them to English and transcribed them, resulting in 65 pages of text. 
Following Lindlof and Taylor (2002), but with a critical edge, we began a careful 
process of familiarizing ourselves with the data while also remaining curious and open 
to ways in which conventional concepts of intercultural conflict were being called into 
question (Alvesson & Deetz, 2000). Both authors read and re-read the written tran-
scripts and the first author also listened to the audio-taped interviews conducted with 
American managers to gain additional insights. Throughout the initial analysis we fo-
cused on identifying and characterizing managers’ accounts of intercultural conflict. 
As we compared our initial findings with previous research on intercultural conflict 
in joint ventures, we were struck by how culture was but one form of difference aris-
ing in these accounts. Instead, as these managers talked, their descriptions of intercul-
tural disagreements were layered with references to other forms of difference including 
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nationality and race/ethnicity. To gain additional insight and refine our analysis, we 
re-framed intercultural conflict as an expression of political struggle. Guided by the 
sensitizing concepts of struggle over action, voice, interests, and identity, each author 
then closely re-read the interview transcripts and noted ways in which various forms 
of struggle appeared to arise in these conflict accounts (Corbin & Strauss, 2008). We 
then used thematic analysis techniques (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002; Owen, 1984) to select 
those accounts that best illustrated experiences with struggle. Through a series of in-
dependent analyses and collaborative data sessions, both authors generated interpre-
tations of the data. 
Interpreting Accounts of Intercultural Conflict as Struggle 
Managers described disagreements emerging around a diverse set of issues including 
employee promotions, employee layoffs, compensation, accounting practices, product 
naming, and orientations to customer service. Guided by Fleming and Spicer (2007) 
we analyzed their accounts for the ways in which they animated the overlapping pro-
cesses of coercion and refusal, manipulation and voice, domination and escape, and 
subjectification, and creation. 
Struggles of Coercion and Refusal 
Struggles of coercion and refusal arise around action and involve the interplay of force 
and blockage which occur when one person is directed to do something different from 
what he or she would have chosen to do (Fleming & Spicer, 2007). In our sample, power 
and resistance became evident in accounts of simple refusals to follow a counterpart’s 
orders, or of more interactive responses to pressures to act differently than preferred. 
For example, when asked to describe a disagreement with his Western partner, Sheng 
detailed a conflict over product naming. While his American boss told him ‘‘we must 
do this,’’ Sheng and his colleagues thought ‘‘that if we do this, it will cause us many 
troubles. We can only put it aside and not do it … We said ‘‘ok’’ but in fact, we did not 
do it.’’ Sheng doubted whether his American boss understood or cared about what he 
characterized as the ‘‘historical reasons’’ for refusing to follow the order. Sheng ac-
knowledged that although the process of naming products may change in China it will 
take time, and in his experience, Western managers are prone to push for rapid change 
and then move on, without bothering to learn much about the Chinese context. Sim-
ply refusing to obey the Western boss made sense in the absence of longer term oppor-
tunities to make differences in product naming practices in China more meaningful. 
In another example, Michael characterized his Chinese partners as having ‘‘dis-
obeyed’’ him. Before departing on a work trip he had ‘‘left specific instructions on what 
to do regarding the business’’ and was upset to learn upon his return that ‘‘his instruc-
tions had not been carried out’’ as he had directed. Michael said he ‘‘could have lived 
with’’ the decision his Chinese partners made, but instead he chose to ‘‘back it up and 
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say, ‘we can’t do that.’’’ If Michael wondered why his Chinese partners acted in oppo-
sition to his orders, he did not say so during the interview, nor did he describe steps he 
might have taken to better understand their reasons for resisting his directive. 
As both these accounts suggest, Western managers struggled to adapt their ex-
pectations of operating autonomously with little government intervention, to China’s 
business environment. Several Chinese partners spoke of this issue, with Yuan suc-
cinctly describing how his Western counterpart ‘‘may be free doing things in other 
countries. In China, he cannot be that free. In the free market, he can use his method. 
In China it is not like this.’’ Long, a Vietnamese-American manager talked about how 
his company does a lot of construction in China, and how in North America they ‘‘just 
go, find the vendor and we follow our procedure, bid the job and make a decision our-
selves,’’ but that in China local law requires the government to be a part of the deci-
sion. His initial reaction was ‘‘this is our company, we bid our company money, and 
there’s nothing that we need them to do for us.’’ But through conversations with his 
Chinese partner, Long came to understand the importance of working more closely 
with the government: 
We had many lengthy discussions clarifying our position of how do we best meet the 
local government requirements and best not violate the guidelines of the company. 
So we, I finally worked it out, came up with something that I could support. 
Feeling constrained by Chinese law, but unable or unwilling to simply refuse to com-
ply, Long entered into a lengthy negotiation of differences with his Chinese counter-
part. At the same time, the change in frame from ‘‘we’’ worked it out to ‘‘I’’ worked it 
out, makes it clear that Long positions himself as not simply or easily giving in to the 
demands his Chinese partner placed on him. 
These accounts of intercultural conflict illustrate the interplay between coercion and 
refusal arising around managerial action in Sino-American joint ventures. They also il-
lustrate different communicative responses to pressures for managers to do what they 
normally would not have done under similar circumstances in a different context. The 
willingness to slow the communication process down so as to work more cooperatively 
with the Chinese government, despite preferences to the contrary, stands in communi-
cative contrast to simpler interaction cycles of issuing orders, refusing orders, and re-
issuing orders. In this way, refusal is not about refusing orders as such, but about re-
fusing to obey certain instructions because of the absence of an opportunity to explain 
the Chinese context or to have a more extended discussion of differences. 
Struggles of Manipulation and Voice 
Struggles of manipulation and voice involve the ways in which certain actions are posi-
tioned as impossible and the extent to which this can be questioned (Fleming & Spicer, 
2007). This was most evident as managers described what they would have liked to 
have said, but did not, during disagreements with their counterparts. It was most pro-
nounced for Chinese managers and involved differences in the value placed on data 
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and money to justify decisions, and the possibility that racial and cultural bias influ-
enced the way their American counterparts related to and treated the Chinese. 
Differences arose over the importance placed on data to influence or justify deci-
sions. For American managers this seemed to be a taken-for-granted feature of the de-
cision-making process, while for the Chinese, it seemed more a matter of political ex-
pediency. For example, Ying indicated that when she and her Western counterpart 
disagree, she ‘‘generally would look for some documents to persuade him’’ because, 
based on her experience: 
if you want to explain our differences to him, he would not bother if you don’t have 
documents. He then would be quite stubborn and insist on his opinion. If you cannot 
show him documents, you will not be able to persuade him. 
Similarly, Jun, a Chinese-American manager dealing with tensions over salary differ-
ences between Shanghai and Beijing described how he provided his Chinese co-man-
ager with data from salary surveys, assuming that this would help him convince his 
own Chinese employees of the need for higher salaries in Shanghai than in other parts 
of China for the same job. He added, ‘‘having this salary survey information, you know, 
quantitative information helps very much. It’s something that he can take back to his 
management and use as evidence.’’ His Chinese partner can say ‘‘here it is; this is what 
the market is. In order to get qualified people this is what we have to pay.’’ While a co-
operative gesture, at least on the surface, Jun assumed that data alone would be suffi-
cient to help his Chinese partner explain or defend a decision that still may be experi-
enced as unfair. 
Throughout the interviews, many American managers said that they wished their 
Chinese counterparts would be more direct in expressing disagreements with them. 
For instance, Mei, a Chinese manager (originally from Singapore) described herself 
as someone who encourages the local Chinese staff to speak up, ‘‘because in Amer-
ica, now, they speak out … I think we [the Chinese] should speak out more.’’ Yet, Mei 
grew concerned that she might have offended her boss by speaking up as she did. She 
went on to wonder: 
if you handle the Americans, you know, it’s like you have to be more aggressive. Oth-
erwise, I think sometimes that, especially Americans … take advantage when you be-
come too timid or you don’t speak up, you know? … if you speak up they will know, 
oh, this person cannot be bullied or things like that. But there have been cases, I’m 
not saying all Americans, but they sometimes for racial reasons, I find, in fact, yeah, 
there is definitely some discrimination in terms of races. 
As this account suggests, voice depends upon matching the communicative aggres-
siveness of Americans, but even then, racial or cultural bias can prevent the Chinese 
voice from being heard. 
The theme of cultural bias was also apparent in Ying’s account of intercultural con-
flict in which she perceived that Western managers discriminated against the Chinese 
in the promotion process. During her interview, she struggled to share her concern that: 
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being a Chinese, we should not count solely on the person’s English proficiency or 
the relationship with the boss in deciding one’s promotion. I think many people don’t 
like to speak, yet they are competent and are doing a good job. 
Concerned that her counterpart was under-valuing the contributions of Chinese em-
ployees who could not speak English, her comments explicitly confront the racial pol-
itics of promotion: 
if that person is to be promoted, this other and that other should be promoted, as we 
should take into account the issue of overall balance. We can’t just be like those for-
eign companies, promoting whoever you want to … it’s better to promote someone 
who is well-respected. You can’t promote those that would talk to you more. The im-
pact would then be too great. I think the Americans don’t understand this. That’s why 
I have to think of a way to tell him the Chinese way of seeing things. 
Accounts of intercultural conflict involving poor treatment due to racial or cul-
tural bias were much more likely to be offered by managers from the Chinese side 
with Ying commenting that while her ‘‘current partner is fine; he can listen to your 
opinion and respect your opinion … the former financial manager gave me the im-
pression that he looked down on the Chinese. He did not listen to you. He did not 
understand.’’ Another person, Li, commented on being aware of bias, noting that 
while ‘‘it’s best to be direct’’ with his American partner, ‘‘it depends on what kind 
of person you are talking with. Our second general manager is an easy-going guy, 
even though he is an American. He accepts others’ opinions. The other two [Ameri-
can managers] were not this way.’’ 
Struggles of voice manifested around perceived obstacles to questioning taken-for-
granted business practices. Chinese partners considered the possibility of dismissive 
responses or culturally or racially biased treatment when deciding whether to speak 
up. Based on these accounts, intercultural conflicts with Western counterparts are con-
structed at least partially as struggles for social equality. 
Struggles of Domination and Escape 
Struggles of domination and escape involved conflict around interests and the ways in 
which groups tried to change company goals (Fleming & Spicer, 2007). Given the hybrid 
design of Sino-American joint ventures, struggles around interests were embedded in 
the everyday lives of managers from both sides. Here, managers’ accounts seemed to 
routinize intercultural conflict, framing it as a natural and necessary feature of working 
together in this context. As Hao, a Chinese partner put it, ‘‘People with different cultural 
backgrounds and different values will have different views … it is natural to have these 
processes when people of different cultural backgrounds and values get together.’’ Jun, 
a Chinese-American manager, seemed to share this view, commenting that: 
the relationship is not adversarial in that I say white and he says black. It’s just not like 
that because we’re both focused on making the company successful … so we want to 
do what’s best for the company, for the joint venture, so from that standpoint, when 
270   Krone & Steimel in J .  of Intnl.  & Intercultural Communication 6 (2013)
we have a disagreement, it’s not really disagreeing, we are discussing how best to do 
what needs to be done for the best interests of the company. 
At the same time, framing cultural differences as natural did not prevent conflicts 
around interests from unfolding. For instance, Hao explained: 
Sometimes Chinese do not care much about money. They care more about face. West-
ern managers do not think like this. If you want to do this, I pay you and that’s it. It 
is so simple. The Chinese may think, for doing this, even if you give me some money, 
I will not do it. I am afraid of losing my face. 
Huang, a Chinese-American manager framed the problem this way: 
the Chinese problem, seems to me that the focus is not the same; they focus on the 
people, they want to keep the people, pay the payroll and that’s the main thing and 
the profitability of the company is not the main objective of the company so there is 
probably a major disagreement. Of course, we agree that we should take care of the 
people better … but it is not the first priority. For example, we found we got too many 
employees and it’s not efficient enough so we have to lay off, that is for the profitabil-
ity [of the company] we have to make money to survive and to pay the employees. 
On the Chinese side when you look at it, the profitability is not the most important 
thing. You know, it seems to be that they would rather have a loss for a few years. 
The differences between Chinese and American interests expressed in these exam-
ples exemplify concerns that routinely came up as sources of intercultural conflict. 
While both sides articulated an awareness of such differences, their accounts also sug-
gested some unevenness in the communicative work required to construct a meaning-
ful understanding of those differences. For example, Li found balancing the pursuit 
of long-term corporate development goals (e.g., investment in product development, 
personnel training, and quality enhancement) with stockholders’ interests in profit, all 
within the Chinese context, exhausting. He summarized that he and his Western coun-
terpart ‘‘have different perspectives, difference priorities, different backgrounds and 
different interests, and therefore I am very exhausted … I have the responsibility to as-
sert as well as to protect the Chinese side’s interests, while, more importantly running 
the corporation well.’’ Despite his exhaustion, this manager said that he ‘‘still has to go 
on’’ for if he failed to adequately represent the Chinese interests, he ‘‘would feel very 
tired, even if we can make profits.’’ 
For their part, American managers were more often positioned to educate and ad-
vocate on behalf of business principles proven to work successfully in the West. For ex-
ample, Jun, an Asian-American human resources manager, felt: 
that in order to hire the best people you need to pay fair compensation … that’s from 
our perspective … the Chinese side comes from a background where more things have 
to be equal and has to be fair to everyone so that if this one person who might be in 
sales … a sales person in Shanghai uh, he or she joins us, uh he or she expects a sal-
ary and we will probably have to give them a salary that’s a lot higher than what we 
are paying in Beijing for similar jobs. And it’s purely because of supply and demand, 
and that’s where I think my co-manager has difficulty dealing with that. 
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These accounts suggest a routinization of conflicts over interests, with American 
managers trying to run the business as they would in the West and Chinese manag-
ers questioning the suitability of Western practices to the Chinese context. Framed this 
way, American managers selectively and temporarily accommodated the interests of 
their Chinese partners. Doing so, however, rarely called into question the values un-
derlying a Western business model. In this context, intercultural conflict does not pro-
duce a transcendent and lasting synthesis of different interests, but produces a series 
of ongoing, temporary negotiations of differences between a relatively fixed Western 
business model and a Chinese model that is still being worked out. 
Struggles of Subjectification and Creation 
Struggles of subjectification and creation highlight identity and focus on the politics 
arising from attempts to control identity construction (Fleming & Spicer, 2007). The 
everyday experience of sharing control over the management of Sino-American joint 
ventures provoked identity struggles around what it means to be an effective man-
ager in this context. In their accounts of intercultural conflict, managers deployed dif-
ferent discursive resources as they struggled to negotiate the other side’s demands on 
their performance as managers. Chinese managers tended to draw upon a discourse 
of ‘‘staying Chinese’’ while American managers struggled to both modify and defend 
a managerial identity grounded in abstract, technical expertise. 
As illustrated earlier, several Chinese managers drew upon a nationalistic dis-
course to recount their conflict experiences and did so in such a way that the process 
of ‘‘staying Chinese’’ appeared to serve as a strategic resource in their disagreements 
(Hardy, Palmer & Phillips, 2000). For example, Ying characterized the capitalistic 
market economy as ‘‘a battlefield’’ and said that while cooperating with an American 
company is useful, he could not ‘‘compromise my principles, forget that I am Chi-
nese.’’ For him, the ultimate goal of any Sino-American joint venture was to ‘‘build 
an enterprise culture that is suitable for Chinese society’’ to which he added that 
‘‘this is very important [because to] depend on American culture does not work.’’ 
Constructing a managerial identity in China is more complex than simply learning 
about what works for managers from other countries. Rather it requires a constant 
process of ‘‘staying Chinese’’ or carefully appropriating foreign practices and prin-
ciples to the Chinese context. 
To be sure, the Chinese partners wanted Western managerial expertise, as Michael, 
an American manager noted, ‘‘I have shared with them Western ideas of how to look 
at the market and they have adopted most of those ideas.’’ Yuan, a Chinese manager, 
confirmed this, noting that ‘‘in the management aspect, Western people have better ex-
periences. We should pay attention to it.’’ Furthermore he said, ‘‘The reform needs not 
only technology and capital, but also management. … they [Western managers] have 
done it and succeeded … we must learn from them.’’ 
At the same time, when describing how they handled conflict, Chinese managers 
frequently distanced themselves from their American partners by drawing unfavorable 
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comparisons that implicitly constructed a preferred managerial identity. For instance, 
Sheng acknowledged that while the personalities of some foreigners are more open than 
others, more generally ‘‘foreigners do not understand the actual situations in China.’’ 
He went on to characterize foreigners as hard to deal with saying ‘‘to a Chinese you 
just need to say one or two sentences, he will know what you mean,’’ while a foreign 
manager ‘‘may not understand even though you spent half a day explaining it to him.’’ 
Yuan, who had earlier acknowledged the need for Western managerial expertise, also 
drew clear distinctions, framing the Chinese as more patient in correcting employee 
performance. If a poorly performing employee did not understand ‘‘we may talk to 
you many times. They may not have such patience. They do not act like us.’’ Piao also 
pointed out that ‘‘there is no group concept among American managers’’ and wanted 
‘‘foreign managers to understand this collective concept.’’ He characterized this as ‘‘a 
kind of process involving cooperating, communicating, and discussing together,’’ rather 
than just ‘‘simply passing on messages,’’ and felt that the Chinese staff may ‘‘think they 
[American managers] lack a human touch’’ because they do not pay enough attention 
to relationships. Articulating social distinctions such as these expands the nationalis-
tic discourse of ‘‘staying Chinese’’ to include what they frame as culturally unique re-
lational processes. Doing so amplifies value differences between groups and perhaps 
strengthens the capacity of the ‘‘staying Chinese’’ discourse to withstand the univer-
salizing tendencies of American managerial discourse. 
For their part, American managers routinely referred to their technical expertise 
while also recognizing the need to adapt their managerial style to the local context. 
That some managers compared the experience of working with their Chinese part-
ners to ‘‘international diplomacy’’ or to ‘‘helping my children with their homework’’ 
illustrated adjustments in their identity and performance as managers. In addition, 
while they recognized the need to adapt their managerial expertise to the local con-
text, the conflict accounts of other managers constructed this process as a struggle 
between operating as business experts and cultural outsiders. Alluding to this ten-
sion, Michael began by recounting advice he had received from his predecessor who 
had told him: ‘‘You’ll do okay as long as you remember you’re a visitor in China.’’ 
For this manager: 
I have to remember that I’m the visitor here and I should be the one that’s making ad-
justments, uh, that they shouldn’t really. At the same time there’s a reason that they 
want ex-pats here and that’s to make some improvements, and so we need to be able 
to make those improvements along the way. 
Speaking from a similar perspective, David spoke to how the status of ‘‘visiting man-
ager’’ required greater cultural sensitivity than managers like himself were used to or, 
as he put it, to succeed Western companies had to: 
be more sensitive … [if] a Western company is gonna participate in China’s success in 
the future, they’re gonna have to be able to be sensitive to the Chinese way and learn to 
work within that, rather than think that you can make the Chinese change to your way. 
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As he continued, David re-framed cultural sensitivity as a managerial strength: 
if you’re culturally sensitive, that doesn’t mean you’re weak, it means that you’re tap-
ping in to the energy of China and going along with it rather than trying to push back 
almost 1.3 billion people. It’s not gonna happen for you if you do. 
And as Michael put it, cultural sensitivity required the additional work of adjusting his 
normal managerial style in light of what he considered the heightened interpersonal 
sensitivity of the Chinese: 
We have to be considerate of their culture. In the United States or in Canada where 
I’ve worked before you can be angry at people and you can say things that are very 
harsh to people one minute and five minutes later you can be pattin’ the guy on the 
back and it’s acceptable. And probably the wounds take longer to heal in China you 
know because they feel so deeply uh about different things. 
Re-framing cultural sensitivity as a managerial strength makes it possible to continue 
drawing upon a taken-for-granted managerial discourse as a resource in contexts that 
disrupt its generalizability and potentially expose its fragility. 
Positioning oneself as a short-term visitor could also defend against identity threats 
that can arise when managing on someone else’s ground. As David outlined: 
I wish I spoke Chinese, although I don’t think it’s necessary. What people want is the 
knowledge and help I can bring. Some Western companies, to an extent my own, think 
that by hiring a Chinese person who grew up in the U.S. and was educated, and mak-
ing him a manager, he’s a Chinese manager. I keep saying ‘no he’s not.’ If all he does 
is speak English and doesn’t know [the company] and doesn’t know the technology, 
he’s worse than nothing. What China doesn’t need is more Chinese. 
He went on to explain that his presence and expertise allowed the Chinese to make bet-
ter decisions about how they will progress in the future. As for him: 
being here is a great adventure; to be in China at this time of change is uh, an excit-
ing thing for me. I can’t imagine a better place to be than to work here. My agreement 
with my company is that I’ll work here as long as I’m having a good time and enjoy 
it. Then I’ll leave. 
Based on these accounts of intercultural disagreements, the need to adapt Western 
managerial knowledge and practice to the Chinese context is necessary, but potentially 
threatening to managerial identity. In response, American managers assert the need 
for cultural sensitivity while also re-asserting the value of Western managerial exper-
tise. Trying new communication behaviors such as cultural sensitivity and managing 
on someone else’s ground co-exist with the discourse of ‘‘staying Chinese,’’ animat-
ing some degree of struggle in the construction of Sino- American managerial identity. 
Re-framing Intercultural Conflict as Cooperative Struggle 
Sino-American joint ventures bring together different nations and cultures, creating 
space in which a variety of foreign and domestic interests meet, merge, and sometimes 
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clash. In our study, we have attempted to move beyond categorical approaches to un-
derstanding intercultural conflict and the negotiation of business interests in favor of 
developing more politically sensitive understandings. In particular, our results illus-
trate differences in the nature of conflict accounts within cultural groups, not just be-
tween them. Attending to the ways in which current partners not only converge with 
but also diverge from previous partners seems to produce more nuanced and socially 
sophisticated accounts of intercultural relationships and conflict, and greater appreci-
ation for the relational dynamics associated with more and less satisfying relationships 
with partners. In addition, our results illuminate how national cultural frequently in-
tersected with gender, race, or political/ economic systems to complicate these manag-
ers’ accounts of intercultural conflict. For example, feminizing portrayals of partners as 
highly or overly sensitive calls into question the credibility of their experience and its 
legitimate contribution to co-managing the joint venture. Reducing cultural differences 
to national culture masks the ways in which multiple forms of difference contribute to 
disagreements and subverts a fuller exploration and understanding of differences. Fi-
nally, our results highlight the strategic deployment of national cultural discourse and 
how it can operate to construct and account for disagreements. The discourse of ‘‘stay-
ing Chinese’’ may say less about the nature of a single, unified Chinese national culture 
than it does about a struggle for control, especially when pitted against a universaliz-
ing managerial discourse that positions itself as largely culture-free. Viewed through 
the lens of struggle, discrete episodes of intercultural conflict become understood as 
part of an endless, sometimes strategic, engagement of multiple forms of difference 
that partners struggle to make meaningful. In the process, differences in interests ap-
pear to be interwoven with struggles around voice, action, and managerial identity. 
Our analysis confirms that engaging in such struggles can become destructive, 
resentful, or loving. According to Fleming and Spicer (2007), struggle becomes de-
structive when actors seek to destroy each other, resentful when actors display their 
unhappiness at being dominated, and loving when actors recognize the other’s right 
to exist and affirm the other by calling him/her into question. Based on these con-
flict accounts, the potential for destructive struggle arose when managers framed 
the other as incapable of understanding or learning about differences either in man-
agerial practices or in culture. While not necessarily an active attempt to destroy the 
other, such framing practices legitimized attempts to avoid interacting, thus repro-
ducing the other as ‘‘learning disabled’’ and constraining the creation of new under-
standings of themselves and each other over time. The potential for resentful strug-
gle arose when partners simply refused the demands of the other side. The discourse 
of ‘‘staying Chinese’’ drew attention to the incompatibilities between American man-
agerial practices and the two discourses sometimes clashed without producing new 
understandings of either side. And finally, the potential for loving struggle arose 
when co-managers acknowledged differences and attempted, in good faith, to learn 
more about and work with those differences. When Chinese managers agreed to try 
American management practices to see if they would work in China, and American 
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managers agreed to adjust their practices to the demands of the local situation, both 
sides were affirming the other’s differences as deserving of consideration and a force 
to be reckoned with. 
Based on our re-interpretation of intercultural conflict in the context of Sino- Ameri-
can joint ventures, we propose building upon the idea of struggle to include the critical 
management practice of cooperative struggle. Following Spicer, Alvesson, and Karreman 
(2009), we position cooperative struggle as a critical managerial performance designed to 
challenge conventional managerial discourse and contribute to progressive manage-
ment practice. As a critical management practice, cooperative struggle calls into ques-
tion the assumed political neutrality of managerial discourse, considering its potential 
to privilege white, European-American, masculine values. It recognizes the politics of 
the discourse of ‘‘staying Chinese’’ and puts it more directly in conversation with the 
technical discourse of managerial expertise promoted by foreign managers. This will 
not prevent struggles over action, voice, interests, or identity, but it should help pro-
duce a more open discursive space in which to engage multiple struggles more fully and 
creatively. Articulating the experience of struggling to ‘‘stay Chinese’’ or of struggling 
to direct business processes and outcomes while working on someone else’s ground 
could become starting points for conversations capable of producing creative, hybrid 
models of management that draw upon a plurality of voices and values. 
We believe the historical, political, and economic context of China informs and ani-
mates struggles around action, voice, interests, and identity in the management of Sino-
American joint ventures. While the legal conditions of ownership may favor the West-
ern partner and provide it with a formal advantage (Wels, 1996), the overall success of 
the corporation still depends, in part, on identifying differences that can and cannot be 
negotiated. Tension between values embedded in the practices of free market capitalism 
and those guiding China’s long-term economic development may be among the dif-
ferences most difficult to negotiate. Grounded in the values of free market capitalism, 
Western managers’ technical expertise is less conditioned by government intervention 
or the need to manage on behalf of an individual country’s long-term economic devel-
opment. Refusals to follow Western managerial advice thus may be rooted in attempts 
to maintain and protect differences related to the role of Sino-American joint ventures 
in China’s state-guided, transitional economy. Differences in these comparatively nar-
rower and broader frames of reference may help explain the interplay between coercion 
and refusal, manipulation and voice, domination and escape, and subjectification, and 
creation that we observed in managers’ accounts of intercultural conflict. The need to 
understand and make differences between these frames of reference meaningful, con-
tributes to the production of struggles around action, voice, interests, and identity. A 
progressive management practice, then, would involve attempts to equalize struggles 
around action, voice, interests, and identity over time so that both sides share in the 
on-going work of making such differences meaningful. Rather than attempting a sim-
ple transfer of business principles to the Chinese context or relying on the Chinese side 
to do the work of appropriating these principles to the Chinese context, cooperative 
276   Krone & Steimel in J .  of Intnl.  & Intercultural Communication 6 (2013)
struggle would involve a day-to-day process of contextualizing Western management 
principles and practices together. Engaged in this way, cooperative struggle might dis-
rupt some of the assumptions of free market capitalism and create more interesting con-
versations about the European-American business model, helping Western managers to 
learn from their Chinese partners as well as to instruct them. As a critical management 
practice, cooperative struggle would affirm the contradictions between Chinese social-
ism and free market capitalism and allow these differences to circulate more evenly 
throughout the organization. In this way, contradictions can become the basis for rou-
tine communication and collaborative decision-making or the foundation of more re-
spectful understandings of value differences that cannot be negotiated. 
While equalizing struggles around action, voice, interests, and identity all seem im-
portant to the progressive management of Sino-American joint ventures, the capacity 
to cooperate in struggles around voice may be foundational. Since voice is an interac-
tive process capable of producing reflection on the ways in which certain actions be-
come normalized while others are made impossible, the presence of racial and/or cul-
tural bias can restrict such interaction so that the struggle for voice becomes one-sided. 
Approaching the struggle for voice as cooperative requires managers from both sides 
to interact in ways that provoke a thoughtful consideration of differences in what may 
seem normal. Cooperative struggle then entails the production of discordant interac-
tion capable of disrupting and calling into question the presence of cultural or racial 
bias in decision-making. In this way, struggles for voice might intersect positively with 
struggles around interests so that discussions of what would be practical in the local 
context receive greater consideration in relation to what might be more profitable on 
a global scale. Voice becomes less of an individual struggle for influence than a some-
times antagonistic, but still cooperative interactive accomplishment among managers 
from both sides. 
The results of our project confirm that understandings of communication and inter-
cultural conflict in international business contexts will be well-served by embedding the 
study of conflict episodes in a larger context of struggle. Social actors who manage to 
provide responsible leadership in international settings are enabled and constrained by 
a range of cultural, political, and economic forces. Identifying the contours of the criti-
cal management practice of cooperative struggle is an attempt to assist those committed 
to working with the social complexity produced by the interaction among these forces. 
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